Court agrees to hear appeal over €75,000 award to man mistakenly named as tax defaulter

High Court reporters

The Supreme Court has agreed to hear a further appeal over a newspaper article in which a businessman was mistakenly named as a tax defaulter.

Last year, a High Court jury awarded William Bird €75,000 after it found the article in the Limerick Leader, published by Iconic Newspapers Ltd in June 2016, was defamatory.

In its pleadings, Iconic relied on the defence of qualified privilege under section 18(2) of the Defamation Act 2009. In the course of the High Court hearing, the journalist who wrote the article accepted Mr Bird’s name had been published by mistake.

Iconic appealed the High Court decision, but the appeal was rejected by the Court of Appeal last March.

Iconic then sought leave from the Supreme Court to appeal the matter, which agreed to give it a priority hearing.

In its application for a further appeal, Iconic argued the Supreme Court had yet to consider whether the qualified privilege defence can apply to publications at large and/or mass media publications.

It was also submitted that if this can be argued, then to what extent can it be and what criteria have to be satisfied for its application.

There is also the question of the relationship between the qualified privilege defence and the defence of fair and reasonable publication on a matter of public interest under the same Act.

Mr Bird, who is in his 80s, opposed the application for appeal.

Among his arguments was that Iconic's interpretation of the defence of qualified privilege provision is so unstateable as not to merit further judicial consideration.

He also said that if the Supreme Court does grant leave to appeal, it should be given a priority hearing given his advanced age and the length of time that has passed since the article was published in 2016.

In its determination, the Supreme Court said that having regard to the significant constitutional value given to the good name of the citizen on the one hand, and the value of freedom of expression on the other, it appeared that the decision involved matters of public importance sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirements for such a further appeal.